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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court
of Salt Lake County declaring the operation and effect of
sections of the Utah Liquor Control Act, Title 46, Utah Code
Annotated 1943.
Action was commenced by the Attorney General for the
State of Utah to determine whether certain conduct of the
defendants was in violation of Sections 46-0-157a, 46-0-168
and 46-0-23 7 Utah Code Annotated 1943. Because appellant
is in agreement with the ruling of the District Court as to
Section 46-0-15 7a, no issue is being taken in that regard in
this appeal, and plaintiff likewise does not contend that the
operations. of the defendants· are. in contravention of Section .
46-0-168.

It is the construction of Section 46-0-23 7 by the

trial court which is the basis of this appeal.
There is no substantial- fact issue between plaintiff and
defendants, the case having been submitted upon stipulations
between the parties.
. The facts as stipulated, and a~ found by the triaJ court,
show the follovving:
The defendants are 11 nonprofit corporations of th~ State
of Utah, and in their corporate capacity occupy buildings or
portions of buildings. All. of these corporations are bona fide
clubs and the State does not conteng that any of them was
organized for the purpose of evading the· Utah Liquor Control
Act.
4
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Not\\·ithstanding the high purposes of the clubs, and the
honorable tnotives of their n1en1bers, each of the defendants
maintains what is known as a liquor ulocker system" whereby
lockers of varying sizes are let to members of the clubs (Tr.
109, 11·-L 12 0, 12 2, 12 .1, 12 9, 13 _1, 13 7, 1-11 , 14 2 d) .

The
ttlessees,, may, if they desire, store in these lockers alcoholic

beverages purchased from the Utah Liquor Control Cotnmission.

Some of the defendants allow only the holder of

the locker to have a key, others retain a master key by \vhich
officials or certain employees may open any locker.
In addition to the lockers mentioned, each defendant
maintains a room or rooms-which may or may not be separate
from the locker room-in which members (and in the case
of some of the clubs, guests) may convert the liquor and
other ingredients into a finished mixed drink. To this end the
defendant clubs supply ice, glasses and various types of mixers
-either for cash or a signature on a slip.

The clubs will,

however, furnish ice, mixers and soft drinks to liquorless
patrons without a price differential. In some of the clubs only
the ingredients are supplied; in others, members may by paying
a small service charge have an attendant do the mixing.

The

plaintiff ·does not, for the purposes of this appeal, regard
these differences in practice as being n1aterial.
As an aid to the-construction of the Liquor Control Act
the State introduced a certified copy of the enrolled House Bill
41 of the 1935 State Legislature (Ex. nA").

The defendants

put in evidence some opinions issued by the office of Attorney
General ~f Utah, and data regarding the number of beer
licenses issued in Salt Lake City.

In open court it \vas stipu-

5
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lated that the locker system has been in existence in Utah
in some form or other since before the repeal ·of prohibition"
(R. 166).
lC

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court improperly ruled that the operations

and methods of the defendants are not contrary to the provisions of 46-0-23 7 Utah Code
Annotated 1943.
(a) Section 46-0-23 7 Utah Code Annotated
1943, by its terms makes an offense of
maintaining an establishment where persons are permitted to resort for the drinking of alcoholic beverages.
(b) The plain meaning of a statute may not
be varied by contemporaneous construction.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THAT THE
OPERATIONS AND METHODS OF THE DEFENDANTS
ARE NOT CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF 46-0-237
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943.
(A) SECTION 46-0-237 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1943 BY ITS TERMS MAKES AN OFFENSE OF MAINTAINING AN ESTABLISHMENT WHERE PERSONS ARE
PERMITTED TO RESORT FOR THE DRINKING OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.

6
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It is the contention of the plaintiff that Section 46-0-25 7
Utah Code Annotated 1943 shows a legislative intent to make
a common nuisance of any establishment where a number of
persons are frequently permitted to gather and consume alcoholic beverages, \vhether or not these persons violate other
provisions of the Liquor Control Act. The section in question
provides:
tt.~:"\ny

room, house, building, boat~ vehicle, structure
or place where alcoholic beverages are n1anufactured,
sold, kept, bartered, stored or given a\vay, or used in
violation of this act, or U'here persons 1'esort for the
drinking o.f alcoholic bet·erages} and all alcoholic beverages, packages, equipment or other property kept or
used in maintaining the same, are hereby declared to
be con1mon nuisances; * * * '' (Italics added).

It is also provided that persons who maintain such common
nuisances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Under 46-0-2~!8
Utah Code Annotated 1943, common nuisances of the preceding
section may be abated by court proceedings.
It is not disputed that the defendants maintain rooms or
buildings wherein persons are permitted to n1eet and drink
alcoholic beverages. But it is contended, on the other hand,
that this practice does not amount to ((resorting'' as that term
is used in the statute, and that the statute was not meant to
prohibit drinking in «private clubs."
A glance at the history of the legislation will give us an
· idea of what the legislature had in mind when it adopted the
present wording. Th~ Liquor Control Act originally appeared
as Chapter 43, Laws of Utah 1935. At that time 46-0-23 7
was Section 195. It then read:
I
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***

or where persons resort for the drinking
of alcoholic beverages contrary to the provisions of this
act, * * * are hereby declared to be common nuisances."
(Italics. added.)
(l

As the section then stood it was arguable, if not clear, that
under its terms something more than a mere ''resorting" was
needed to make an establishment a common nuisance. The
resorting would have to have been in violation of some other
.positive provision of law.
The act was amended in some details in 193 7. At that
time the legislature deleted the words •tcontrary to the provisions of this act," and left the section in the form in which
it now appears in the code. If the legislautre in 193 7 had
been seeking a way of making a substantive offense of the
mere maintaining of a place where persons resort for the drinking of alcoholic beverages, it is difficult to comprehend a
simpler way of doing this than the method adopted.
Certainly some effect must be .given to the change 1n
wording. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that where the legislature changes the wording of a
statute it thereby intends to change the law.
The general rule relating to the effect of amendment
of an existing statute is found in Sutherland on Statutory
. Construction ( 3rd Ed.) Sec. 1930;
t'Because it is defined as an act that changes an
existing statute, the courts have declared that the mere
fact that the legislature enacts an amendment indicates
that it thereby intended to change the original act by
creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one.
Therefore, any material change in the language of the
.8
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original act is presun1ed to indicate a change in legal
rights."
In In re Segregation of School District No. 58 fron1 Rural
High School District No. 1, 34 Idaho 222, 200 Pac. 138, the
Supreme Court of Idaho says:
ttAn intentional on1ission of \Yards by a legislature
should be given effect (citing cases). Where changes
haYe been introduced by amendment, it is not to be
assumed that they were without design; usually an
intent to change the law is inferred. Springfield Co.
v. Walton, 95 ~1o. App. 526, 69 S. W. 477; Duff v.
Karr, 91 :Nio. App. 16. However, every change of
phraseology does not indicate a change of substance
and intent. * * * A change of language has more
significance "\\'here the purpose is to amend a single
statute than in a general revision or codification.''
The amendment in the instant case did not con1e in during a
general revision of the code. See also Yarbrough v. Collins,
91 Tex. 406, 42 S. W. 1052; Rieger v. Harrington, 102 Or.
603, 613; 203 Pac. 576, 580; Pierce v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. (2d)
513; 70 Pac. (2d) 206.
It is not unreasonable to seek to prevent such resorting. As
an aid to law enforcement the legislature may prohibit many
things which are not in themselves bad. During prohibition,
\vhen the sale of intoxicating beverages was unlawful, many
states also prohibited the sale of certain similar non-intoxicants
for the reason that such sales might enable persons to evade
the provisions relating to intoxicants. In a situation \vhere. the
state is given the power to make all sales of intoxicating lic.1uors
it is. legitin1ate-and possibly \vise-for the legislature to

9
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prevent the maintaining of establishments· which could become
a shield for the sale of intoxicating liquors contrary to law.
The history of intoxicating liquors is a history of legislative attempts to devise the most effective means of control.
There has been legislation on the subject in England since the
early days of the common law, and in America since colonial
days. See 7 Law and Contemporary Problems 544. It is not
startling, therefore, to assume that the legislature of Utah,
in seeking a means of liquor law enforcement, looked to the
past and to prior statutes. Our provision relating to ((resorting" is not a child of the imagination of the Utah legislature.
·The cases show that substantially similar provisions have been
used by various ·states.
In State v. Owens et al., 9 Kan. App. 595, 58 Pac. 240,
the defendants had been convicted of keeping a place where
persons were permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking
intoxicating liquors as a beverage. On appeal the defendants
contended, inter alia, that the act should be interpreted to
operate upon places where persons resort <(in violation of law."
On this question the Kansas ·court said:
<(But the offense charged is not the possession of the
liquors, nor the giving a\vay of liquors, but the keeping
of a place where persons were permitted to resort for
the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors as a beverage. The keeping of such a place constitutes the
gravamen of the offense, and in this connection we
may remark that the giving by a person of a drink of
intoxicating liquor to a friend upon such person's own
premises would not, as is contended by appellant's
counsel, constitute a violation of the nuisance section
of· the prohibitory law, even though the clause under
10
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consideration be construed in its literal sense. The
\vord (resort' n1eans sotnething of a con1n1on occurrence,-the habitual frequenting of a place by more
than one person. * * *
l'hat part of the prohibitory liquor Lt\\' '"hich defines (common nuisances' is as follo\vs: tAll places
\vhere intoxicating
liquors are n1anufactured, sold,
L'
bartered or given a\\·a~· in violation of any of the
provisions of this act, or where persons are permitted
to resort for the purpose of drinking intoxicating
liquors as a beverage, or '"here intoxicating liquors
are kept_ for sale, barter, or delivery in violation of
this act, are hereby declared to be common nuisances.'
* * * To construe the second clause as appellant's
counsel would have us would be, in effect, to hold it
a mere repetition of the first and third clauses. As the
legislature otnitted the qualifying words, (in violation
of the provisions of this act,' from the ·second clause,
we are led to the conclusion that it \Vas the intention
of the legislature to make the ckeeping' of a place to
which persons habitually resort for the purpose of
drinking liquor as a beverage a crime, whether any
other provision of the prohibitory law was violated at
such place or not."
..l

In the above case the court was dealing v1ith an original,
unamended statute.

Where the statute has been amended,

as in the present case, and the words {(contrary to the provisions

of this act" eliminated by subsequent action of the legislature,
the argument that there must be an additional violation loses
all force.
In Shelton v. State, 191 Ind. 228, 132 N.W. 594, the
court \Vas called upon to construe a section of the Indiana la\v
which made a place a common nuisance if persons were
11
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permitted to resort there for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors. On affirming the conviction, it was said:
((Proof that she maintained a place where persons
were permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking
intoxicating liquor as a beverage was sufficient to
sustain a verdict of guilty."
In State v. Poggmeyer, 91 Kan. 633, 138 Pac. 593, a conviction for maintaining a common nuisance was sustained
where the evidence showed that meetings pad been held in
a rented room every two weeks for thirteen weeks and that
beer had been served at four of the meetings.
In State v. Topeka Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac. 183, 29
L.R.A. (N.S.) 722, the Kansas Supren1e Court, in discussing
the "resorting'' and related provisions of Kansas law, said:
n'The main and principal object of this statute does
not seem to be merely to prevent people from drinking
their own liquor as a beverage, but its real purpose
is to prevent the organization .of associations for the
purpose of maintaining a place where a large number
of people are ·permitted to l<eep intoxicating liquor
and use it as a beverage."
It is admitted that the above cases are not of recent vintage.
They were in the reports at the time the Utah Liquor Control
Act was originally passed. They were still_in the reports \vhen
the act was amended in 1937. We must assume that when
the legislature adopted the present statute it meant also to
adopt interpretations of the language used.
In In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 138, 158 Pac.
705, this court recognized such a rule of construction \vhen
.

'

it said:

12
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nln vie\V that the decisions of Iowa were in effect
before that section was adopted by the code comtnission of this state in 1898, we must assume that the
construction placed upon it by the Supreme Court of
Jo,va '''as likewise adopted.''
The rule thus announced has been generally follo\ved in this
state. See In re Co\van' s Estate, 98 Utah 393, 396, 99 Pac.
(2d) 605; Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170,
177; 97 Pac. (2d) 937, 126 A.L.R. 1~~18; Fuller-Toponce Truck
Co. v. Public Service C~mmission, 99 Utah 28, 35; 96 Pac. (2d)
722. When the present Hresorting" provision was adopted in
Utah the meaning of nresorting" under similar acts \vas firmly
established.
The construction contended for by appellant would not
require a holding that all licensed beer vendors are also guilty
of maintaining common nuisances, even though beer does come
of ((alcoholic beverage'' under the Utah
within the defihition
,
act. The. reason is pointed out in Sopher v. State, 169 Ind.
177, 81 N.E. 91:, 14 Ann. Cas. 27, 14 L.R.A. (N.S. )- 172.
This case points out that while such sales might be nuisances
under a general section, .the fact that they are licensed by
authority of the state removes them from the general operation
of the prohibitory section. In holding that evidence of a
license should have been received in this prosecution for maintaining a nuisance, the Indiana court said:
((A publ~c nuisance, strictly speaking, arises out of
the violation of public rights, and as a general rule
results in no more special injury to one person than to
another. Such nuisance always arises from unlawful
acts. Consequently that which is lawful cannot be
regarded in a legal sense as a public nuisance.·

13
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Therefore, if the Legislature, by a statute which it
is competent for that body to pass, authorizes an act
or acts to be done, which in the absence of such a
statute, would otherwise constitute a public nuisance,
such act or acts, are thereby made lawful, and cannot
be considered or regarded in a legal sense as a nuisance
so far as the public is concerned, unless the Legislature
in enacting the statute has exceeded its power."
Defendants' pleadings and the findings of fact make much
of the circumstance ( \vhich we acknowledge) that the clubs
are of ·an outstanding character and composeq of high-class
members. A similar contention was made in State v. Topeka
Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac. 183, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 722. The
court said:
('The legislature doubtless believed that, if persons
were permitted to maintain club rooms in which liquor
was kept for use as a beverage, the practice, however
innocent in itself, v.rhen carried. on. in good faith,
might easily be converted into a medium for the sale
of liquor under the form of maintaining a club, and .to
. prevent this practice for~ade a course of conduct where
sales, if made, would be difficult to detect and punish.

***
We conclude that the chief purpose of this section
was to prevent a practice which might encourag~ and
perhaps lead to sales of intoxicating liquors at such
places. It is therefore fairly within the scope of the
title to the act, and is not unconstitutional. It may
be said of the club that on account of the careful
manner in v;hich it has been managed no serious objections have been urged against it, but under the. rules
and regulations v.rhich it has adopted, an association of
men inclined to violate the law and trespass upon the
peace and· good order of society might become a very
unsatisfactory and objectionable institution.''

14
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Con1menting upon the fact that only 15 of the 140 tnembers
actually used the locker system of the club, the court said,
ttthis * * * is due to the character of the n1embership rather
than to the character of the organization."
And in Harvey v. 1t1issouri Athletic Club, 261 Ivlo. 576,
170 S.\X'. 904, L.R ..:\. 1915 C 876, 5 A.L.R. 1192, the court
con1mented upon the dispensing of liquors as being "iqcidental" to the main purposes of social clubs incorporated under
a statute providing for the formation of benevolent, religious:
scientific and educational associations, by saying:
''to render respondents' contention applicable it must
be further assumed that the sale of liquors, concretely
stated, is related to either benevolence, religion, science,
or education,- or that it is incident to one of such objects,-.a rather unusual relationship, to say the least."
While the present case does not involve the ((sale" of liquors,
the principle involved is the same.
The court below admitted an incapacity to draw the line
between what conduct would amount to resorting and what
\vould not. It placed upon the appellant t_he burden. of distinguishing bet\veen those cases where the statute would in
every instance apply and those in which it ':'ould not. Inasmuch
as the appellant was not able to do this to the satisfaction
of the trial court, that court ruled, in effect, that there are no
situations in which the statute applies. We submit that it
is not necessary to the decision of this case to delineate with
fine precision the results of all possible cases where the question
n1ight again arise. The only point to be determined in this
action is \':hether the defendant clubs are violating the section
15
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tn 1ssue. It was not necessary for the trial court, nor for this
court, to detennine whether the prohibitory· words of 46-0-23 7
would apply to homes or to the use of sacramental wine.s in
churches. We have before us a case where the statute clearly
applies. The trial court used the .. backward approach" to
statutory construction and found that inasmuch as there might
be some cases in which the statute would be of doubtful meaning it is doubtful as applied to all situations. The method
adopted below was to use statutory construction in order to
create, rather than to solve, an ambiguity. The court belo\v
was obligated only to ru'le whether the present defendants
were within or without the statute; it was not required to draw
a sharp line which would resolve, in advance, all possible future
litigation which might arise under 46-0-23 7.

(B) THE P~AIN MEANING OF A STATUTE MAY
NOT BE VARIED BY CONTEMPORANEOlJS CONSTRUCTION.
The defendants have relied upon the doctrine of contempor_aneous construction because of the fact that they have
operated. in their present manner for a number of years. The
oral stipulation, as pointed out in the statement of facts, was
to the effect that the locker system has been used in Utah since
before the repeal of prohibition. It is plaintiff's belief that
under such circumstances it cannot be contended that the users
of the locker system had n1uch regard for the question of
whether or not it was legal. A.nd it is just as logical to infer,
from the facts, that enforcement officers have been lax in their
duties as it is to infer that the legislature intended that the
locker system should be lawful.
16
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The n1ost serious objection to \vhich the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is open in the instant case is that
this doctrine of statutory construction may not be used to vary
the plain meaning of the statute. Bridge and Highway Departnlent v. Felt, 21-l Cal. 308, 5 Pac. (2d) 585. It should
ahvays be rejected ,,·here it is unreasonable or clearly erroneous.
Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Company, 285 U. S. 1, 16, 76 L.Ed.
587, 52 S. Ct. 275. In the case of State ex. rel. University of
Minnesota vs. Chase, 175 Minn. 259; 220 N.W. 951, the
court used the following language in meeting the argument of
contemporaneous construction:
UThere is thus abundant ammunition for the argument of practical construction. But the case furnishes
it no target. We cannot even adopt it as a buttress
for a conclusion already reached, as is sometimes done.
State ex rel. Hilton v. Sword, 157 Minn. 263, 265, 196
N~W. 467. A practical construction of anything writ-ten--constitution, statute, or contract-is but an aid
to interpretation, not to be _resorted to unless such an
aid is required. In a real but broad sense, it is true
that (words always need interpretation; that the. process
of interpretation inherently and inv-ariably means the
ascertainment of the association between words and
external objects; and that this makes inevitable a free
resort to extrinsic matters for applying and enforcing
the document. * * * All the circumstances must be
considered which go to make clear the sense of the_
\vords.' 5 Wign1ore, Ev. (2 Ed.) sec. 2470(3). But
when that sense is made or becomes plain, the process
of interpretation ends. In construing a constitutional
provision or any writing, first resort is to letter and
spirit. That implies application of v.'riting to subject
matter. If without going farther the meaning is plain,
interpretation is at an end. Resort cannot then be had
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to the extr~neous to obs,ure what is already clear, and ·
so start again the process of construction and excuse
resort to further extraneous aids. The extraneous or
subsequent cannot be resorted to as a means of refuting
what is inescapable fr9m the instrument itself in application to its .subject. It is not then permissible to
adopt any different practical construction of a constitution ,hov1ever long continued or \vell established,
or however distinguished its authorship. Hence, every
authoritative statement of the doctri?e of practical
construction makes it applicable only in a case of
doubtful meaning. See for example, Springer v.
Philippine Islands, ____ U. S. ____ , 48 S. Ct. 480, 72 L.ed.
522, 527. The doctrine is allowed its 'fu11 legitimate
force * ·* * to solve in its own favor the doubts which
arise on reading the instrument to be construed.' 1
Cooley,- Canst. Lim. ( 8 ed.) 151. It may illustrate
or confirm, explain doubt or expound obscurity, but
'it can never abrogate the text, it can never fritter away
its obvious sense, it can never narrow down its true
limitations, it can never enlarge its natural boundaries.'
1 Story, Const. ( 5 ed.) sec. 407.
· Where the controlling words have a definite meaning and involve no absurdity or self-contradiction,
'then that meaning apparent upon the face of the instrument is the one which alone we are at liberty to
say \vas intended to be conveyed. In such a case there
is no room for construction. * * * Neither courts
nor legislatures have the right to add or to take a\vay
from that meaning. * * * It must be very plain, nay,
absolutely certain, that the people did not intend \vhat
the language they have employed, in .its natural signification, imports, before a court will feel itself at
liberty, to depart from t4e plain reading of a constitutional provision.' State ex rel, Childs v. Sutton,
63 Minn. 14.7, 150, 65 N.W. 262, 30 L.R.A. 630, 56
A.S.R. 459, quoting frotn Ne,vell v. People, 7 N.Y.
18
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9, 97.

Compare State ex rei. Putnam v. Holn1, 172
~linn. 162, 215 N.W. 200. Were the courts, sitnply
because of its extended duration, obliged to follow
an erroneous practical construction of a plain provision
of it, a constitution could be amended without consuiting the people. Nothing is farther fron1 the basic
theory of our governn1ent. t\Vhen the meaning and
scope of a constitutional provision are clear, it cannot
be overthro\\'n by legislative action, although several
times repeated and never before challenged.' The
delay in presenting the question is no excuse for not
giving it full consideration and determining it in
accordance \vith the true meaning of the constitution.
Fairbank v. lT. S. 181 U. S. 283, 311, 21 S. Ct. 648,
45 L.ed. 862.
\Ve find it unnecessary to discuss the argument based
upon the debates in the state constitutional convention.
They show nothing opposed to our conclusions. They
are but another aid to be resorted to only in case of
doubt. To us, the language of art. 8, sec. 4, of the
constitution of ~1innesota admits of no doubt.''

And even if the statute before us is open to interpretation,
the doctrine of administrative or contemporaneous construction
should not change the result.

In 2 Sutherland on Statutory

Construction ( 3rd ed.) Sec. 5104, it is said:
"The conclusiveness of a contemporaneous and practical construction will depend upon a number of additional elements that give efficacy to the rule. In general,
these elements are: ( 1) that the interpretation originated from a reliable source; ( 2) that the interpretation has continued for a long period of time and received wide acceptance, and ( 3) that the interpretation
\vas made at or near the time of the enacttnent of the
statute."
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We submit that not one of the elements listed above is present
in the instant case. There is no showing that the construction
has been "contemporaneous, long, uniform and practical."
See People ex rel. DeBoer v. Geary, 323· Ill. App. 32, 54
N.E. (2d) 840.
In any event, -the court must weigh contemporaneous construction against other extrinsic aids in the interpretation of
the statute. Board v. Borgen, 192 Minn. 367, 256 N. W. 894;
Jordt v. Board, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 591, 96 Pac. (2d) 809.
We have shown that other maxims of statutory construction
lead to the conclusion that defendants' conduct is unlawful
under the provisions of 46-0-237 Utah Code Annota~ed 194_1.
For the doctrine to apply it should appear that the construction contended for has been called to the attention of the
Legislature, and informal interpretations by administrative
departments will be given little weight. Helvering v. N.Y. Trust
Co., 292 U. S. 455, 78 L. ed. 1361, 54 S. Ct. 806.
That enforcernent officers have been derelict in enforcing
the provisions of a particular statute will not later estop the
state from enforcing the act, and may be doubtful evidence
of legislative intent. Ada County v. Boise Commercial Club,
20 Idaho 421, 118 Pac. 1086; Commission ex rel. Huntsman
v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company, 143 Ky.
314, 136 S.W. 1032; Louisville v. State Board of Education,
154 Ky. 316, 157 S.W. 3·79. Even where non-action is taken
to indicate a contemporal)eous construction it should appear
that the non-action is a result of thoughtful interpretation
20
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rather than accident.
(3rd ed.) 520.

2 Sutherland on Statutory Constr~ction

The above cases indicate that the court erred in finding
the legis~ature did not intend to prohibit the type of conduct
now being engaged in by the defendants.

CONCLUSIONS
The Utah legislature adopted, \Vith tninor variations, a type
of common nuisance section which had appeared often in
statutes of other states. The interpretation placed upon such
sections prior to its adoption in Utah was such as would make
unlawful the operations and methods of the defendants. It
is presumed that the legislature meant to adopt the section as
interpreted. And this is even clearer v1hen it is noted that the
section \vas materially amended in 193 7 to conform to earlier
acts.
The meaning of the statute thus being clear, the doctrine
of contemporaneous construction has no application. But
even if this doctrine may be used, it is under the circumstances
such a weak indication of legislative intent that the interpretation of the statute under other principles may not be altered.
For the above reasons we believe the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed and this court should enter a declaratory judgment to the effect that the locker system as practiced
by these defendants is within the prohibition of Section 46-0-23 7
Litah Code Annotated 1943.
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·Because all issues are issues of law there is no necessity
of remitting the case to the trial court for further actio~.
·.,

· Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,.
Attorney General

J.

LAMBERT GIBSON,
Deputy Attorney General

MARK K. BOYLE,
Assistant Attorney General

BRYCE E..ROE,
Assistant Attorney Genet·al
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